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PRICE EXCHANGE AGREEMENTS: MOVING TOWARD
A PER SE RULE
In United States v. Container Corp., 1
 the Supreme Court held
that an agreement among competitors to exchange on request infor-
mation as to the most recent price charged or quoted with a resulting
stabilization of prices constituted a price-fixing conspiracy in violation
of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 2
 The decision has been interpreted
by some as meaning that price exchange agreements are now per se
violations of the Sherman Act.' This comment will examine the stan-
dards of legality applied to price information exchange agreements in
both earlier price exchange cases and in Container to determine whether
the latter Court has adopted a per se rule, or has merely placed further
limitations on ,price information exchange agreements through a rule
of reason approach.
I. THE RELATIONSHIP OF PRICE-FIXING TO THE EXCHANGE OF
PRICE INFORMATION
Initially, the relationship between a price-fixing agreement and an
agreement to exchange prices must be determined, for differing stan-
dards of legality under Section 1 of the Sherman Act have historically
applied to each. A prerequisite in both cases, however, is that a
"contract, combination, or conspiracy" exist. 4 The Court has generally
interpreted "combination or conspiracy" quite broadly.' In Container,
for example, the Court found that an understanding among manufac-
turers that each would furnish "the data with the expectation that he
would be furnished reciprocal information when he wanted it" was
sufficient to meet the combination or conspiracy requirement.'
The second requirement for a price-fixing violation under the
Sherman Act is that the agreement have the purpose or the effect of
raising, lowering, or stabilizing prices by interfering with free market
forces involved in price setting.? Under a price-fixing agreement, either
formal or tacit, competitors agree to charge a certain price for their
product. The Supreme Court has rejected the rule of reason to deter-
mine whether price-fixing agreements are helpful or injurious to free
competition and has adopted a per se rule of illegality. In the leading
price-fixing case, United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 8 the Court
concluded that there could be no justification for an agreement to set
1 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
2 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
3 United States v. FMC Corp., 5 CCH Trade Reg. Rep. 1; 72,901, at 87,433 (ED.
Pa. Aug. 22, 1969); Interphoto Corp. v. Minolta Corp., 295 F. Supp. 711, 717-18 (S.D.N.Y.
1969).
4 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
6 Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 360 U.S. 208, 221-30 (1939).
6 393 U.S. at 335.
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940).
8 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
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prices, for such an agreement, in and of itself, has the effect of restrain-
ing price competition. The Court noted that
[a] conspiracy to fix prices violates section one of the
[Sherman] Act though no overt act is shown, though it is not
established that the conspirators had the means available for
accomplishment of their objective . .
Thus, under the Socony-V acuum rationale, an agreement to fix prices
is illegal per se, and the defenses of reasonableness of price, benefit to
the public, or the ineffectiveness of the agreement are not available."
A price information exchange agreement differs from a price-
fixing agreement in that the parties do not agree to charge the same
price. An agreement to exchange price information is basically an ar-
rangement where competitors furnish and receive information con-
cerning past, present, or future market prices of a certain commodity.
The arrangement may take various forms and include a variety of
characteristics. For example, the agreement may include a central
agency for collecting, interpreting and disseminating the price infor-
mation; 11 it may require that subscribers provide information under
the overt threat of penalty; 12 or it may require that a member adhere
to his reported prices until informing members of a change.' As op-
posed to the per se rule applied to price-fixing agreements, the Court
has traditionally examined the particular characteristics of a price
information exchange agreement to determine its legality.
The critical difference between price-fixing agreements and the
mere exchange of price information, therefore, results from their
respective positions in the price setting process. The price-fixing agree-
ment is the final step in price setting, while the exchange of price in-
formation is an intermediate step. In a truly competitive system an
individual does not know what his competitor will charge for similar
merchandise and is free to set his prices according to his costs. How-
ever, when competitors enter into a price-fixing agreement, they col-
lectively set the market price, and the element of uncertainty in pricing
is removed altogether.
When competitors agree to exchange price information, on the
other hand, the final step in the price setting process has not been
reached. Each party to a price exchange agreement knows the prices
or pricing plans of his competitors, but he cannot be certain what his
competitors will charge. Thus the element of uncertainty as to a com-
petitor's pricing policy is still present, and each subscriber's decision
may be an independent one.
Recognizing this critical difference, the Court has historically
treated price information exchange cases differently from price-fixing
9 Id. at 225 n.59.
10 Id. at 220-21.
11
 See, e.g., American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921).
12
 See, e.g., United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371, 382 (1923).
18 Id. at 389.
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cases. Utilizing the rule of reason, the Court has examined the total
factual situation in each case to determine if the price exchange agree-
ment has the purpose or effect of restraining price competition.
II. THE TRADITIONAL STANDARD OF RESTRAINT OF PRICE
COMPETITION APPLIED TO PRICE INFORMATION EXCHANGE
AGREEMENTS
The Court's utilization of the rule of reason in price information
exchange cases requires a different method of proof than that required
to prove a price-fixing agreement. Since price-fixing is the final step in
the price setting process, an inference is made that a restraint of price
competition results from the agreement. Thus it is only necessary to
show that an agreement to fix prices exists in order to prove a violation.
However, since a price exchange agreement may permit competitors to
set prices through independent action in an atmosphere of uncertainty,
the agreement may not necessarily have the purpose or effect of re-
straining price competition. The exchange may be designed only to
inform competitors of market conditions, and more complete market
knowledge could aid, rather than stifle, price competition. Under the
ideal model of perfect competition, complete market knowledge by all
competitors is not only desirable, but necessary." Thus the Court gen-
erally examines the circumstances surrounding the exchange agree-
ment, including the particular characteristics of the agreement, the
setting in which it was made and the effect of the agreement on market
prices. In this manner, the Court determines if the purpose or effect of
the agreement is the illegal restraint of price competition.
A logical starting point in the search for criteria determinative of
the legality of price information exchange schemes is an analysis of
Supreme Court cases involving price exchange agreements. In Amer-
ican Column & Lumber Co. v. United States," the Supreme Court
held an agreement to exchange information relating to prices il-
legal under the Sherman Act because it restricted competition by
maintaining and increasing prices. The Court reached this deasion
by examining the characteristics of the plan involved to determine its
purpose and practical effect. The defendant association denied the
14 See Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 582-83 (1925),
where the Court stated:
It is the consensus of opinion of economists and many of the most important
agencies of government that the public interest is served by the gathering and
dissemination of information with respect to the production and distribution,
cost and prices, in actual sales, of market commodities, because the making
available of such information tends to stabilize trade and industry, to produce
fairer price levels and to avoid the waste which inevitably attends the unintelli-
gent conduct of economic enterprise. Free competition means a free and open
market among both buyers and sellers for the sale and distribution of com-
modities. Competition does not become less free merely because the conduct
of commercial operations becomes more intelligent through the free distribution
of knowledge of all the essential factors entering into the commercial transaction.
15 257 U.S. 377 (1921).
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existence of any plan to agree upon prices or production, claiming that
the true purpose of the plan was to substitute "co-operative competi-
tion for cut-throat competition" and to "enable each member to intelli-
gently make prices and govern his production!' The Court found
that in practice the plan's features, which included the soliciting of
members' forecasts of future business conditions, frequent meetings,
and analysis of reported information by an expert employed by the
association who subsequently distributed "significant suggestions as to
both future prices and production," indicated that the purpose of the
agreement was price-fixing." The Court noted that
[mjen in general are so easily persuaded to do that which will
obviously prove profitable that this reiterated opinion from
the analyst of their association, with all obtainable data
before him, that higher prices were justified and could easily
be obtained, must, inevitably have resulted, as it did result,
in concert of action in demanding them."
The Court thus found that the purpose of the agreement was to raise
prices regardless of cost!' This finding was strengthened by evidence
that the actual effect of the plan was a significant price rise in the
lumber industry.'
In reaching the decision that the agreement in American Column
was a violation of the Sherman Act, therefore, the Court examined
both the purpose and the effect of the agreement by analyzing both its
characteristics and its implementation. This approach was also adopted
in United States v. American Linseed Oil Co." The Court found that
the characteristics of the agreement in American Linseed—a strong
central collection and dissemination bureau, penalties for failure to
comply with the terms of the agreement, current price lists, names of
buyers and the withholding of the price information from buyers"—
had the inevitable tendency to destroy real competition and thereby
restrain trade.
This conclusion was based not on the mere existence of the ex-
change agreement, but upon the examination of the entire contract "in
16 Id. at 392-94.
17
 Id. at 399.
18 Id. at 407.
19 Id. at 409. The Court also noted:
Genuine competitors do not make daily, weekly and monthly reports of the
minutest details of their business to their rivals. . . This is not the conduct of
competitors but is so dearly that of men united in an agreement, express or
implied, to act together and pursue a common purpose under a common guide
that, if it did not stand confessed a combination to restrict production and in-
crease prices in interstate commerce and as, therefore, a direct restraint upon that
commerce, as we have seen that it is, that conclusion must inevitably have been
inferred from the facts which were proved.
Id. at 410.
20
 Id. at 409.
21
 262 U.S. 371 (1923).
22 Id. at 380-84.
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light of what has been done under it . . . ." 23 Thus the Court examined
the agreement as implemented to determine its effect. The Court em-
phasized that the possible forfeiture of a substantial sum of money,
which the subscriber deposited with the association upon enrollment as
a member, constituted a financial penalty designed to insure com-
pliance with the agreement. The Court concluded that the agreement
as implemented eliminated the subscriber's freedom of action in manag-
ing its affairs at a given moment, thus restraining free competition and
violating the Sherman Act. 24
Under American Column and American Linseed, then, it can be
concluded that the Court specifically condemned certain characteristics
of price exchange agreements which evidenced a purpose or effect of
restraining price competition. By utilizing this approach the Court did
not condemn all price information exchange agreements, but carefully
examined the provisions and the implementation of each agreement in
reaching a decision.
The first two cases in which the Court upheld price information
exchange agreements were Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United
States" and Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass'n v. United States." In
Maple Flooring the agreement provided for the reporting of average
costs in the industry, the gathering and dissemination of statistics by
the secretary of the association, and the distributing of the information
to buyers and sellers on request. The information exchanged identified
neither buyers nor sellers in specific transactions." The Court found
that these characteristics did not provide evidence that the purpose of
the agreement was the restraint of price competition, and that the case
must turn on the effect of the activity carried on by the association
under the terms of the agreement.
In examining the effect of the agreement in Maple Flooring, the
Court distinguished American Column and American Linseed. The
Court noted that in American Column, the purpose and effect of the
agreement was to increase prices, as evidenced by the activities of the
expert analyst employed by the association, and by the fact that the
defendants exchanged names and addresses of purchasers and current
prices. In American Linseed the Court noted that the illegal purpose
and effect of the agreement was evidenced by the fact that the agree-
ment contained financial penalties for failure to report prices, required
adherence to the prices once reported, disclosed names of buyers and
sellers, and reported current prices.'
The Court observed, however, that the Maple Flooring agreement
included none of the condemned provisions of the two earlier cases, and
thus had neither the effect nor the natural tendency to restrain price
23 Id. at 389.
24 Id. at 389-90.
25 268 U.S. 563 (1925).
26
 268 U.S. 588 (1925).
27 See 268 U.S. at 566-74.
28 Id. at 581.
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competition. The Court reasoned that a price information exchange
scheme is not illegal in and of itself but becomes illegal when it is used
in a concerted effort to raise, lower or stabilize prices at a certain level
or within a narrow range." The Court also noted that the fact that
prices become uniform after a price exchange agreement begins to
operate does not render the agreement illegal without proof that the
agreement had the purpose or the effect of a concerted effort to cause
the uniformity. With the necessary proof lacking, the Court distin-
guished the earlier cases stating that in American Column and Amer-
ican Linseed
f t]he unlawfulness of the combination arose not from the fact
that the defendants had effected a combination to gather and
disseminate information, but from the fact that the court
inferred from the peculiar circumstances of each case that
concerted action had resulted, or would necessarily result, in
tending arbitrarily to lessen production or increase prices."
In Cement Manufacturers the agreement was similar to that in
Maple Flooring, except that the buyers were identified. The Court con-
cluded that this particular provision should not be condemned because
it prevented certain fraudulent practices by buyers in the procurement
of cement,u and the Court, relying on Maple Flooring, upheld the agree-
ment." Conceding that the effect of the agreement was to produce uni-
formity of price, the Court found that the uniformity occurred because
the individual sellers met changes in competitors' prices through inde-
pendent decision. The Court stated that
this record wholly fails to establish, either directly or by
inference, any concerted action other than that involved in
the gathering and dissemination of pertinent information with
respect to the sale and distribution of cement . . . and it fails
to show any effect on prices and production except such as
would naturally flow from the dissemination of that informa-
tion in the trade and its natural influence on individual
action."
29 The Court reasoned:
We decide only that trade associations or combinations of persons or corpora-
tions which openly and fairly gather and disseminate information as to the cost
of their product, the volume of production, the actual price which the product
has brought in past transactions . . . as did these defendants, and who, as they
did, meet and discuss such information and statistics without however reaching
or attempting to reach any agreement or any concerted action with respect to
prices or production or restraining competition, do not thereby engage in un-
lawful restraint of commerce.
Id. at 586.
80
 Id. at 585.
81 268 U.S. at 603-04.




The Government was successful in proving the prohibited purpose
and effect of restraining price competition in Sugar Institute, Inc. v.
United States. 84 The agreement included provisions requiring adher-
ence by a subscriber without deviation from the prices he exchanged,
and publicly announced prices and price changes. The Court stated
that the adherence requirement eliminated the freedom of the seller to
make individual decisions regarding his price and reduced the uncer-
tainty regarding competitors' prices. Thus the purpose of the agree-
ment was restraint of price competition. The Court made it clear,
however, that the exchange of future prices was not illegal in and of
itself, but that the adherence requirements made the agreement il-
legal."
The Court's treatment of the price information exchange cases
prior to Container indicates that the critical issue in each case was
whether the particular characteristics of the agreement as implemented
operated as a restraint on price competition. Certain characteristics,
by themselves, make price information exchange agreements illegal
price-fixing, such as the adherence requirements in Sugar Institute and
American Linseed. Adherence requirements fix prices because each
seller knows what his competitors are charging, and the pricing deci-
sions may be made on the basis of competitors' prices.
Other characteristics, however, do not necessarily render the ex-
change agreement illegal. The existence of a central exchange bureau
to collect and disseminate price information is not, by itself, conclusive
on the question of the legality of a price information exchange scheme.
A central bureau was a characteristic condemned in American Linseed,
but in Maple Flooring, the provision for the secretary of the association
to collect and disseminate information was not condemned. The reason
for this different treatment centers around the activity of the central
agent or agency. In American Linseed the expert analyst provided
what amounted to a blueprint for action that members followed. In
Maple Flooring on the other hand, there was no evidence indicating
that the secretary of the association did anything but compile the
statistics and send them out to subscribers. Thus the subscribers were
free to make their own pricing decisions—an essential element in free
price competition.
The fact that information exchanged is available only to sellers,
when joined with other supporting evidence, can lead to a conclusion
that there has been a violation of the Sherman Act." Perfect com-
petition requires complete market knowledge on the part of both
buyer and seller. If the stated purpose of an exchange scheme is to
increase and enhance price competition, it is anomalous to deny the
buyer access to the price information exchanged. The Court has de-
clared that an agreement identifying both buyers and sellers was not
34 297 U.S. 5.53 (1936).
35 Id. at 601.
36
 See American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 411 (1921).
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illegal," but no convincing reason exists why an agreement should
provide for identification of buyers and sellers. If the agreement is
merely a planning device, it is not necessary to list specific sales to
identified. customers by specific sellers. If sellers and buyers are identi-
fied, it is very possible that the information will be used by an indi-
vidual seller for discriminatory pricing to meet the prices charged by
certain competitors to certain buyers. If this happens the important
factor of uncertainty dissolves and the agreement verges on price-
fixing.
For purposes of examining Container, the most critical character-
istic in the exchange agreement is the type of price information ex-
changed. The exchange of past prices was upheld in Maple Flooring38
and Cement Institute. Past price information is perhaps less useful
than current or future price information as far as planning is con-
cerned, but past prices can indicate trends in the industry upon which
to plan. Without adherence requirements, the exchange of past price
information does not remove uncertainty as to what a competitor is
charging or will charge, and thus does not reduce individual freedom
in price setting. The problem in the exchange of past price information
is defining what past prices are. In Maple Flooring the prices ex-
changed were those of completed transactions." This may be enough
to define past prices in that the price a buyer paid last week, yesterday
or even that day is not necessarily what he would have to pay the next
day. This may maintain a degree of uncertainty as to what will be
charged and may encourage a competitor to quote his lowest price.
Obviously, the closer the price exchanged approaches a current price,
the more difficult it becomes to infer that the exchange stimulates price
competition.
The exchange of future prices is also subject to abuse. Without
any adherence requirement, however, the exchange may be legal as
long as the individual seller is free to change his announced future
prices. Indeed, competitors may be hesitant to rely heavily on the
information exchanged since it is subject to change at the option of
the subscriber. The price announced may never actually be charged,
and the seller is completely free to price as he pleases. The Sugar Insti-
tute case states that the exchange of future prices itself does not make
an agreement illegal, but any requirement that the seller adhere to the
future price announced makes the agreement illegal." However, even in
the absence of adherence requirements, if competitors meet announced
future price increases, a strong inference arises that the purpose or
effect of the exchange agreement is the restraint of price competition.
The agreement as implemented may raise a presumption that the agree-
ment has changed uncertainty into certainty and that freedom of action
in price setting has been affected.
37
 See Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 Us. 588 (1925).
38 268 U.S. at 585.
89 Id. at 573.
40 297 U.S. at 601.
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The exchange of current prices is perhaps the most useful type of
price information and therefore the most suspect, but at the same
time may not be a clear restriction on price competition. The
danger of abuse when current prices are exchanged, however, may
raise an inference of a restraint of price competition. With such an
exchange the seller has exact knowledge of what a competitor is
charging at the moment. Uncertainty as to the price the seller should
set is not eliminated altogether but is reduced substantially, because
knowing a competitor's price may lead others to charge the same or
nearly the same price, thus preventing pricing according to cost. Thus
the necessary uncertainty in price setting is partially or completely
eliminated. This fact may be the key to an interpretation of the
Container case.
III. Container Corporation: A PER SE RULE?
in Container the Court declared that an informal arrangement
whereby competitors exchanged information as to the most recent
price charged or quoted to identified customers was illegal under
Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Arguably there are four possible
interpretations of the brief and somewhat cryptic majority opinion of
Mr. Justice Douglas: (1) the price exchange scheme as implemented
had the purpose or effect of restraining price competition, and thus
the standards of legality of the earlier cases were applied; (2) the ex-
change of current prices with identification of buyers is illegal per se;
(3) all price information exchange schemes are illegal per se; or (4)
the evidentiary requirements in proving an illegal price exchange
scheme have been relaxed.
Justice Fortas, in a concurring opinion, rejected any theory that the
Court was adopting a per se rule. He views the decision as an applica-
tion of the standards of earlier cases, particularly the American
Column case, reasoning that the agreement was proved to restrain
price competition in fact, and thus a per se rule need not be considered
nor applied." However, it is not clear from Justice Douglas' opinion
that he intended the decision to be this narrow. Early in his opinion
Justice Douglas states: "The case as proved is unlike any other
price decision we have rendered. 742 He then points out differences
between the case at hand and some of the former price information
exchange cases:
There was here an exchange of price information but no
agreement to adhere to a price schedule as in [Sugar Insti-
tute]. . . ['I] here was here an exchange of information con-
cerning specific sales to identified customers, not a statistical
report on the average cost to all members, without identifying
the parties to specific transactions, as in [Maple Floor-
ing]. . . . While there was present here, as in [Cement
41
 393 U.S. at 346.
42 Id. at 334.
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Manufacturers] . . . an exchange of prices to specific cus-
tomers, there was absent the controlling circumstance [of
fraudulent purchasing practices in the cement industry]."
The Court states, however, that "the agreement in the present case,
though somewhat casual, is analogous" to the American Column and
American Linseed cases." The basis for this conclusion is not entirely
clear for, unlike American Column and American Linseed, the Con-
tainer agreement had no adherence provision, no financial penalties for
failure to supply information, and no central bureau or expert analyst.
The trial judge in the lower court carefully distinguished the two
cases from Container, concluding that the facts in Container did not
resemble the facts in those cases 46 Thus the majority argument that
Container is analogous to the two cases must refer to the fact that
each of the three agreements included the exchange of current prices
and the disclosure of names and buyers. The existence of these two
characteristics in all three cases, however, does not provide direct
authority for the illegality of the Container agreement. In American
Column and American Linseed, neither the exchange of current prices
nor the identification of buyers was the determining factor in the
Court's decision. In each of those cases there were additional, more
convincing factors which led the Court to its conclusion that freedom
of action in setting prices had been reduced, thus restraining price
competition. 4°
A second reason why Container may not be a mere application of
earlier standards utilized by the Court is suggested by Justice Douglas:
The inferences are irresistible that the exchange of price in-
formation has had an anticompetitive effect in the industry,
chilling the vigor of price competition.'
4$ Id. (citations omitted).
44 Id. at 337.
45 See United States v. Container Corp., 273 F. Supp. 18, 65 (M.D.N.C. 1967) where
the court noted:
Obviously, the facts present in this case .do not remotely resemble the facts in
American Column. The defendants here were under no compulsion to give or
receive price information, since each defendant was free at all times to do as
he pleased in this regard. . . . No fines or penalties were assessed for failure or
refusal to furnish price information, and there was no compulsion to adhere
to the price requested or received.
The court further noted that the facts in American Linseed were
materially dissimilar to the facts in the case under consideration. We have no
agreement that took away "any freedom of action" of the defendants by
requiring . . . adherence . [or] fine[s]. . . [Mach defendant was at all times
free to exchange, or not to exchange, price information, and each price charged
or quoted was the individual decision of each defendant.
Id. at 66.
46 257 U.S. at 398-412, where the Court placed major emphasis on the activities of the
secretary of the association; 262 U.S. at 389-90, where the Court discussed the adherence
requirement and the strong central bureau.
47 393 U.S. at 337.
328
PRICE EXCHANGE AGREEMENTS
The evidence which led to this irresistible inference differs from that
of the early cases. The Court found that " [t] he exchange of price
information seemed to have the effect of keeping prices within a fairly
narrow ambit."" The basis of this finding was that while capacity
exceeded demand in the industry, and the price trend was downward,
the number of plants and manufacturers had increased. Upon this
evidence the Court concluded that "[t]he result of this reciprocal ex-
change of prices was to stabilize prices though at a downward level .. .
[and thus] . . . the exchange of price data tends toward price uni-
formity."" The Court did not inquire, as was done in Maple Flooring
and Cement Manufacturers, whether the stabilization and uniformity
would have occurred without the agreement.
The lower court opinion and the dissenters in Container both sug-
gest that this inquiry should have been made. Those opinions indicate
that the defendants produced voluminous evidence that there was
vigorous price competition in the corrugated container industry after
the agreement was entered into, and the Government introduced no
evidence as to price levels or profit levels in the industry. The dis-
senters argued that
[t]he Government admits that the price trend was down, but
asks the Court to assume that the trend would have been ac-
celerated with less informed, and hence more vigorous, price
competition. In the absence of any proof whatsoever . . . [i] t
is just as likely that price competition was furthered by the
exchange as it is that it was depressed."
It appears that the Court did not follow the reasoning of the earlier
cases that, as long as freedom of action and uncertainty in price setting
is maintained, the price exchange agreement is legal, but implied that
illegality springs from the existence of a price exchange agreement and
a fairly uniform price structure without inquiring whether the uni-
formity was in fact caused by the exchange agreement. Thus it can
be argued that the Court has removed the critical difference between
price-fixing and the exchange of price information, and has adopted
instead a per se rule to the exchange of current prices when uniformity
of prices is shown.
This contention is further strengthened by the fact that the Court
in Container stated that the exchange of price information tends toward
price uniformity and that the result of the reciprocal exchange of prices
was to stabilize prices, though at a downward level. It thus appears that
the Court is equating price uniformity with price stabilization. Price
stabilization was one of the forms of price manipulation held to be
48 Id. at 336.
49 Id. at 337.
50 Id. at 345-46. The dissenters further noted that "[t]he trial judge found that price
decisions were individual decisions, and that defendants frequently did cut prices in order
to obtain a particular order."
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illegal per se in the Socony-Vacuum case." It may be argued, there-
fore, that when the exchange of current prices tends toward price uni-
formity, the agreement is illegal per se. Thus, once an agreement to
exchange current prices is found, and uniformity of price results, then
the Court need inquire no further as to the actual reasons for the
uniformity, but can infer that the uniformity resulted from the imple-
mentation of the agreement.
A logical extension of this reasoning is that any price information
exchange agreement where uniformity of price is found is illegal per
se. Thus, if past or future prices were exchanged and price uniformity
were shown, Justice Douglas' opinion may be interpreted as requiring
the application of a per se rule. It is submitted that this interpretation
is incorrect, for early in the opinion Justice Douglas carefully distin-
guishes Maple Flooring and Cement Manufacturers from Container,
indicating that the rule laid down in Container does not overrule those
cases in which price information exchange agreements were upheld.'
Then he states that " [p] rice information exchanged in some markets
may have no effect on a truly competitive price."" If a strict per se rule
as to any price information exchange agreement were intended, this
language would be unnecessary.
Thus, Container does not apply a per se rule to all price exchange
agreements nor does it adopt the standards of the earlier price ex-
change cases. Perhaps the most reasonable interpretation is that the
decision reduces the evidentiary requirements necessary to prove that
any price exchange agreement has become price-fixing. In the cases
before Container, the Court fully discussed the evidence presented on
behalf of the defendants and required actual proof that the agreement
as implemented had the purpose or the effect of restraining price com-
petition. In American Column and American Linseed no inferences
had to be drawn from the agreement because the purpose and effect
were clear on the facts. In Maple Flooring and Cement Mfr's, the
Court refused to make any broad inferences:
[I]n the absence of proof of such agreement of concerted
action having been actually reached or actually attempted,
under the present plan of operation of defendants we can
find no basis in the gathering and dissemination of such in-
formation by them or in their activities under the present
organization for the inference that such concerted action will
necessarily result in price uniformity]."
However, in Container the Court inferred from a theoretical
51 See 310 U.S. at 223, where the Court stated:
Under the Sherman Act a combination formed for the purpose and with the
effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a com-
modity in interstate or foreign commerce is illegal per se.
52 393 U.S. at 334-35.
52 Id. at 337.
64 Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 586 (1925).
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model constructed by the Government, that the agreement as practiced
must necessarily lead to the restraint of price competition. The Gov-
ernment proved that the corrugated container industry was an ol-
igopoly, that excess capacity existed in the industry, and that new
competitors were entering the industry. The Government then argued
that where there are few sellers and excess capacity in an industry,
prices should theoretically be driven down far enough to discourage
entry into the industry by new manufacturers. Because new manufac-
turers were entering the industry, the Government argued that a high
profit level must exist, even though the trend of the price level was
downward in the years during which the exchange plan operated. The
Government urged that the necessary inference was that prices would
have declined even faster if the agreement had not been in existence,
and thus that the effect of the agreement was to restrain price competi-
tion. The Court accepted this argument without further evidence as to
causes for price uniformity.
In relaxing the evidentiary requirements to allow an inference of
purpose and effect from the existence of an agreement plus the show-
ing that pricing practices in an industry do not conform to a theoret-
ical economic model, the Court significantly reduced the burden on the
plaintiff by eliminating the requirement that the characteristics of an
agreement have a demonstrable purpose or effect of restraining price
competition. This view of the Container decision indicates that the
importance of the case goes beyond a mere addition to the existing law
and in fact signals a change in the law concerning price information
exchange cases. In earlier cases the evidence of the purpose and effect
of the agreement was analyzed carefully, as required by the rule of
reason. In Container this evidence was not examined, signifying, per-
haps, the demise of the rule of reason approach in price information
exchange cases.
CONCLUSION
Although the Container decision may arguably be a harbinger of
the demise of the rule of reason approach in price information exchange
cases, the opinion should not be read to state that a per se rule should
be applied to any price information exchange case. It is probable that
Container establishes a per se rule as to the exchange of current prices
under the Socony-Vacuum rationale of price-fixing agreements.' But
as far as other types of price exchange agreements are concerned, the
plaintiff must show not only that an agreement to exchange price
information exists, but also that evidence exists supporting an infer-
ence that the agreement has the purpose or the effect of restraining
price competition. It is by lessening this evidentiary requirement to a
showing of theoretical effect that Container changes the standards of
legality applied to price information exchange agreements.
ROBERT P. CRONIN
55 Justice Douglas relied exclusively on Socony-Vacuum to determine the illegality
of the agreement. 393 U.S. at 337.
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